The right man until he isn’t: Graham Arnold and Iraq’s cycle of crisis

Months after guiding Iraq back to the World Cup, Graham Arnold was already facing calls for his dismissal following a chaotic Gulf Cup exit. He survived - for now - but the deeper story lies beyond the coach, inside a football system still shaped by political bargaining, short-term thinking and an enduring search for someone to blame.

Let’s start with setting the scene: After a last-gasp victory over rivals Kuwait, Graham Arnold’s Iraq went into their final group game against hosts Saudi Arabia needing only a single point to advance to the 27th Gulf Cup semi-finals. The Australian coach made wholesale changes in his first two matches and, once again, tinkered with his lineup.

Whatever could have gone wrong, went wrong; Iraq lost 2-0, giving Oman the opportunity to take second place if they won their group game against Kuwait. However, Iraq were still going through – until Oman scored in the 84th minute to make it 3-1.

At the final whistle, there was confusion on the Iraqi bench, while Oman’s players celebrated at full time, believing they had advanced, but they hadn’t. Iraq were seemingly out, but were handed a temporary reprieve.

The caution Oman’s match-winner had picked up for removing his shirt after celebrating his goal put both sides level on all seven group-stage tie-breakers. Both teams were level on absolutely everything, even the number of yellow cards could not separate them. Due to a change of rules by the Gulf Cup organisers, it ridiculously went down to a random draw in the early hours of Wednesday morning at the Intercontinental Hotel in Jeddah. Oman’s name was drawn, and Iraq were out.

Response

When Iraq FA President Younis Mahmoud spoke after the 2-0 defeat, he appeared calm but maintained a subdued and earnest expression. In a peculiar statement following Iraq’s loss to Saudi Arabia, he expressed gratitude for heading the Iraqi team and concluded that he was honoured by the players the FA was supporting and who were making their fans happy. “It is enough for us that we are able to… we have the tools that can make the Iraqi fans happy,” he said incoherently.

Meanwhile, reports in Saudi Arabia indicated FA officials had convened a meeting after the defeat and subsequent draw. While the attending members all backed the decision to sack Arnold, they decided to wait until after a meeting with the Australian coach in Baghdad before making a final decision. 

The Gulf Cup exit mounted pressure on the Australian coach. However, with public opinion still firmly behind him and no viable replacement options available before the Asian Cup, the Iraqi FA chose not to place itself in a precarious predicament. They decided against sacking a coach who has only months left on his contract. The candidates to replace him are a thin list and vastly unpopular.

One was Adnan Hamad, who gave the current Iraqi FA president his international debut in 2002. The 65-year-old had four stints as Iraq’s coach, the last coming in 2008, when he failed to guide the team past the first group stage of the 2010 World Cup qualifiers.

Despite a successful spell as the coach of Jordan, his appointment would be a controversial one. In 2014, following ISIS advances in northern Iraq, he attended a gathering of around 300 Sunni clerics, tribal leaders, representatives of Islamist insurgent groups, and Baath party members, some of whom expressed support for ISIS, viewing them as revolutionaries and part of the resistance. His appointment would not go down well in Baghdad. 

Iraq’s Olympic coach, Emad Mohammed, has also been mentioned, but he would be an equally unwelcome choice.

The former Iraqi international belongs to a modern breed of coaches; having made millions as a player, he skipped the conventional coaching path and chose not to work his way up from the bottom as an assistant. He took charge of top Iraqi Al-Zawraa in 2014, followed by spells at Al-Najaf and Naft Al-Wasat, all with relatively little success.

Consequently, it came as a surprise when he was appointed coach of Iraq’s U17s in 2019, before moving on to the U20s and eventually the U23 side. His sole achievement during his seven years managing Iraq’s youth teams has been qualifying for the 2023 FIFA U20 World Cup, which he achieved after finishing as runners-up in the 2023 AFC U20 Asian Cup.

He reportedly earned a promotion to become the U19s team coach after backing from former teammates and current FA members, Younis Mahmoud and Mohammed Nassir.

Recently, a correspondent for Iraq’s news sports program Al-Kass declared, somehow with a straight face, that according to his sources at the Iraq FA, former FA president Adnan Dirjal was also being considered as a replacement if Arnold were axed.

Adnan Dirjal had managed Iraq from 1992 to 1993 before being sacked after a crucial World Cup qualifying loss, and went on to have a lengthy coaching career in Qatar, but has not coached since 2014.

However, this is simply a ‘dead cat’ strategy deployed by the Iraqi FA – a tactic they have frequently used by administrations post-2003 to shift the debate and allow media and fan furore to die down after a significant defeat or exit from a tournament.

Realistically, the only scenario that would have seen Arnold sacked is if Iraq had suffered a heavy defeat at the Gulf Cup. In that case, needing to deflect blame away from itself, the FA would have stepped in as a “saviour” and sacked the coach immediately – purely for the benefit of Iraqi football, of course.

Following a meeting between the FA and the coach in Baghdad last Saturday – once the uproar had somewhat subsided – Graham Arnold told reporters waiting outside the Iraq FA headquarters that everything was fine.

“Yeah, everything is great,” Arnold declared after emerging from the meeting, where he had presented his technical report on the Gulf Cup campaign in Saudi Arabia.

“Get ready to win the Asian Cup. You guys have to be more positive.”

Renewal

The decision in August to renew Graham Arnold’s contract for an additional six months was highly beneficial for the Iraq FA. As a newly established administration, removing the very man who had secured Iraq’s first World Cup qualification in forty years – even though that achievement occurred under former Iraq FA President Adnan Dirjal – would have been a disastrous start to their four-year term.

Such a move would have made it nearly impossible to win over public opinion. Instead, renewing his contract was viewed as a smooth continuation of Dirjal’s tenure. The former Iraq FA president remains a figure widely loved by everyday fans, even if he is loathed by certain football insiders because he refused to cater to their demands or allow them to manipulate decisions.

This short-term contract served as a seamless transition. The six-month duration benefited both the FA and the coach, granting Arnold the opportunity to manage at the Asian Cup and potentially engineer an upset against his home nation, Australia.

Judging by how Arnold speaks about his past experience managing the Socceroos – and how much it still means to him – he may very well harbour dreams of a return to his old job.

Ultimately, Arnold is only locked into the position until the conclusion of the Asian Cup. For the Iraq FA, he is the right man until he is not – a mindset that has defined the association for the past 78 years, resulting in 85 managerial changes since 1951.

When asked at the press conference in Baghdad why he chose to sign a six-month deal despite being offered a four-year contract, Arnold kept his reasoning somewhat ambiguous:

“I’ll make it very simple. I did it for both of us, not only for myself but also for the Iraqi FA. I just say to you, if they offered me a four-year contract, I would have been the longest-serving coach in Iraq history.

“So, like everything in football these days, all of you people in this room today can love me, and next week hate me. And it’s the same with the fans. And it’s the same with the players.

“And I believe that making this decision is the best, not only for myself but for the Iraqi FA. Because I could have easily signed a four-year contract, and lose the passion for the job, or results don’t go well, and the Iraqi FA would have to pay me out four years.

“And I would rather the Iraqi FA put the money to the junior national teams, for the good of Iraqi football, for the future of Iraqi football.

“But let me say this to you: I am sitting here today with the intention of being successful and being here for four years. So I’m doing this for the best of Iraqi football.”

However, Sarmad Abdelilah, the First Vice President of the Iraq FA, shed more light on the situation. He revealed that Arnold rejected the long-term deal due to several deep-seated administrative issues. The coach felt these structural problems were directly hindering the coach’s goals and was deeply sceptical about whether the environment would improve anytime soon.

Following the World Cup, Arnold had presented the Iraq FA with a comprehensive technical report highlighting major deficiencies. Among his concerns were severe flaws in the medical department and the physical rehabilitation of players.

Furthermore, he explicitly pointed out that young Iraqi talent was being starved of playing time in the Iraqi Stars League due to an excessive quota of foreign players – an issue he warned would continue to cost the national team dearly both now and in the future.

If these reports are accurate, it explains why Arnold did not envision a long-term future in the role. After all, he had previously stated that he only took the job because Iraq hadn’t qualified for a World Cup in 40 years, viewing it strictly as a challenge rather than a permanent role.

Gulf Cup mistakes

The World Cup is now history, but the public has not forgotten Graham Arnold’s historic achievement in guiding Iraq to the finals. While supporters still retain a great deal of faith in him, recent tactical decisions made by the coach at both the World Cup and the Gulf Cup have left many fans deeply worried and questioning the team’s direction with the Asian Cup just around the corner.

Several factors have compounded these doubts: highly questionable squad selections during the World Cup, the ongoing saga involving the FA, the coach, and Hammarby IF’s outstanding young talent Montader Madjed, and unsubstantiated rumours of post-World Cup dressing-room unrest involving three other expatriate players.

Furthermore, Arnold’s trip to the Gulf Cup in Jeddah was intended to serve a dual purpose: win the tournament and integrate several new faces. Ultimately, the coach accomplished neither.

A major point of contention remains Arnold’s stubborn persistence in playing Ibrahim Bayesh, arguably the most divisive member of the squad. Bayesh is a limited player who has been deployed in virtually every position for the Iraqi team except goalkeeper, centre-back, and left-back.

Despite Iraq’s desperate two-year search for a quality right-back to compete with first-choice Hussein Ali, Arnold opted to field Bayesh in that slot rather than giving Newroz SC’s Mohammed Dlawar a chance. Critics argue this is hardly the hallmark of a coach looking to inject fresh blood into the national team.

Additionally, despite Arnold’s defence in the first game that domestic players were better prepared than foreign-based call-ups who only arrived a few days prior, his decision to rely primarily on home-based players backfired in the opening match against Oman.

This miscalculation was made all the more glaring by how much sharper the Iraqi team looked in the subsequent game against Kuwait. In that fixture, he handed a debut to young Olympic centre back Josef Al-Imam and brought on 19-year-old Jussef Nasrawe – a player many analysts firmly believe should have been included in the World Cup squad in the first place.

However, rather than maintaining consistency for the final group match against the hosts, Saudi Arabia, where Iraq required only a single point to advance to the semi-finals, the Australian coach made sweeping changes. He benched Nasrawe and four other players who were carrying yellow cards to prevent them from missing the semi-finals if booked again.

It proved to be another massive blunder. Iraq fell 2-0 to Saudi Arabia while Oman defeated Kuwait 3-1. The results left Iraq and Oman completely deadlocked on points, goal difference, goals scored, and even their disciplinary records.

Amid absolute confusion on the Iraqi bench, a newly appointed team official resorted to showing the players the tournament’s tie-breaking regulations on an iPad. Not the kind of image the Iraqi FA wanted to portray to the public, but an accurate one, none the less.

Younis Mahmoud

The first thing the Iraq FA declared after the elections in May was they were going to appoint a highly qualified foreign technical director to oversee the national teams and a top international referee to head the league’s refereeing committee.

Five months have passed, yet there is no sign of either appointment. Furthermore, the FA is in a dispute with the Ishtar TV production company which holds the broadcasts rights for Iraqi Stars League games), has neglected to pay the third installment of their kit contract with sportswear manufacturer Jako, and have problems paying the wages of the league’s referees.

Five months in, Younis Mahmoud is finally realising the harsh realities of his role, and he is finding it difficult.

At the final whistle in Jeddah, after watching Iraq lose to Saudi Arabia, he sounded completely flustered in his post-match comments. Days later, he appeared even more confused when he claimed Iraq had finished dead last at the previous Gulf Cup, when they had actually finished fifth – mirroring their placement in the current tournament. Incredibly, the exact same erroneous claim was echoed by Iraq’s coach, Graham Arnold.

Mahmoud sounded even more confused, incorrectly mixing up Kuwait with Oman, by stating the Kuwaitis had beaten the Omanis 3-1, and Iraq had lost 2-1 to Saudi Arabia and not 2-0.

It wasn’t the only confusing thing the Iraqi FA president stated. Just four days after the late win over Kuwait, which he celebrated widely at the stadium and in which he praised the backing of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, “…for his support and monitoring of the national team during its participation, confirming that the support provided by the Iraqi government serves as real sponsorship for Iraqi football,” he came out completely contradicting himself after Iraq had exited the Gulf Cup, stating:

“It’s like I am alone on the ship. Everyone has abandoned me. The government has abandoned me. The public doesn’t know about the matter. The media is only focused on bringing down Younis Mahmoud.”

He then put his foot firmly in his mouth, declaring the Gulf Cup wasn’t the prestigious tournament the FA were aspiring to win, personally considering the Asian Cup and the World Cup qualifiers to be more important, after he was asked if he was going to publicly apologise for the team failing to reach the semi-finals.

“It’s not a matter of apologising just to please the fans and saying, ‘Oh, we apologise.’ Why should we apologise? We are working, and for everyone who strives, there is a share of success. For us, this is not the ‘wow’ tournament we are aiming for.”

The Iraq FA

On the popular Iraqi sports television show Studio Al-Jumaher, the newly appointed head of the FA’s media office, Mohammed Khalaf, bluntly told Riyadh Hadi (a member of the previous administration’s media team): “For five years you’ve been feasting on the cake; now, it’s finished.”

He was referring, of course, to the political spoils of the Iraq FA. This exchange perfectly encapsulates how certain members view the association.

Mohammed Khalaf spent the last five years making frequent appearances on sports shows to rant against Adnan Dirjal’s administration, often resorting to outrageous statements and outright fabrications to damage the former FA president.

He once confidently claimed that the Philippines’ 34-year-old goalkeeper, Neil Etheridge – a professional in England since 2008 who was playing for Birmingham City at the time of the statement in March 2024 – had only taken up football a month prior to his country’s match against Iraq in Basra.

Desperate to diminish Iraq’s narrow 1-0 victory at the start of the 2026 World Cup qualifiers, Khalaf retorted, “This goalkeeper used to be a basketball player, and they have only been working with him for a month to get him ready. Before that, he had never played as a goalkeeper.”

Khalaf had previously lost his job as a media spokesperson under former FA president Abdul-Khaliq Masoud. However, the current administration rewarded his vocal, bitter opposition to Dirjal by appointing him the new Director of the Football Association’s Media Office.

This kind of appointment is no anomaly; it is a typical playbook under Mahmoud, with several others securing employment using the exact same strategy. Ironically, many of the former FA members who confidently declared that Iraq would never qualify for the World Cup after their defeat to Palestine in Amman are now back in office.

Mahmoud and his bloc did not run on a platform of progress. Instead, they campaigned on what they could offer the FA’s general assembly in the form of personal incentives – a return to the old patronage systems seen under former FA presidents Hussein Saeed, Najih Humoud, and Abdul-Khaliq Masoud.

Dirjal simply didn’t operate that way; he didn’t know how to. While he expected major political figures to back him for another four-year term, they chose to back Younis Mahmoud instead. The reason for this shift lies in their starkly contrasting leadership styles.

During his time as vice president, Mahmoud attempted to bring dissenting voices into his inner circle. He aligned himself with figures like Ali Jabar and Abdul-Khaliq Masoud’s son, Govand Abdul-Khaliq.

However, this strategy looked less like clever political compromise and more like appeasement and outright surrender. As a result, Mahmoud’s leadership now completely relies on this fragile coalition – to get any major decisions passed, he must secure their backing first.

Dirjal was the exact opposite. He rarely compromised, preferring instead to convince a majority of FA members to rubber-stamp his initiatives. Toward the end of his tenure – specifically after the crushing 2-1 defeat to Palestine in Amman that nearly derailed Iraq’s World Cup dream – the FA president was essentially given free rein.

His detractors wanted to create the impression that he was a dictator making unilateral decisions without internal consultation, even though major moves like appointing Arnold required majority approval. The very individuals who now run the Iraq FA deliberately gave Dirjal enough rope to hang himself, fully expecting him to take the fall when Iraq failed to qualify.

Their plan completely failed when the team succeeded. But they were all conspiring behind the scenes getting ready for the elections in the summer – which they won – after receiving political backing and a bit of gerrymandering with the FA general assembly.

Now, Mahmoud is forced to operate within ‘a something for something’ or quid pro quo environment. For any of his decisions to pass, other committee members must see a direct personal benefit or expect a favour in return.

This transactional system is already damaging the Iraqi national team setup. The dedicated backroom staff that successfully propelled Iraq to the World Cup has been completely gutted.

During the first press conference following the renewal of Arnold’s contract, Khalaf wasted no time introducing the new appointments:

“To begin with, we welcome the accompanying staff supervising the team for this period: Dr Mushtaq Kadhim; assistant coach, Mr Franco; administrative director, Mr Haidar Jalil; and our young, new media coordinator, Alaa Haijel.”

Aside from “Mr Franco” – which was actually Khalaf completely mispronouncing the name of Australian goalkeeping coach Zeljko Kalac – every single one of these individuals was appointed as part of a political favour.

The prime example of this is the new team manager, Dr Mushtaq Kadhim, who replaced the vastly experienced Mustafa Jalal.

Jalal had built an excellent working relationship with the coaching staff and was fluent in English, having been brought in when Arnold first took the job over a year ago.

Dr Kadhim is a former Iraqi youth international who spent the majority of his playing career at Al-Naft Sports Club. Crucially, Al-Naft was founded and is still run by his father, Kadhim Mohammed Sultan (known to everyone at the FA as Abu Shawqi). More importantly, the club holds a voting seat in the FA general assembly.

While Dr Kadhim may be a qualified individual in his own right, it raises serious questions as to why a highly competent team manager who successfully helped navigate Iraq’s World Cup qualification was replaced by someone with far less experience and little to no command of the English language.

Tellingly, the new team manager was forced to sit in the stands for all three of Iraq’s matches at the Gulf Cup, amid unverified reports that Arnold flatly refused to allow him and several other appointed FA officials onto the team bench.

According to sports presenter Omar Riyadh, the incumbent head of the Iraqi FA has less powers than his predecessor. He revealed that in the first meeting of the new FA, Mahmoud wanted the authority to allow him to spend the FA’s funds and then present them later on, like the previous FA president had done.

However, members refused, and they held Mahmoud to ransom, delaying signing the contract of the new general secretary at the FA, Govand Abdul-Khaliq, a close ally of the new president.

Members insisted the length of the general secretary contract would only be for a year, and not four years as first agreed. One member reportedly told the new president, “…forget about us giving you authorisation, because we will not make the same mistake we made with Adnan Dirjal. You are a president after a vote, and I am a member who came by the same way. You have no advantage over me.”

Where to now?

Iraq FA President Younis Mahmoud has announced an ambitious vision for Iraqi football, though he has yet to outline a plan to accomplish it.

He intends to build Iraq’s own version of Qatar’s Aspire Academy – plans for which he recently presented to FIFA President Gianni Infantino. However, no construction has begun, and the architect already appears confused, unsure of the direction Iraqi football is taking just five months into Mahmoud’s presidency.

There is also an ongoing case against the Iraq FA at CAS, that could annul the May elections. Despite the uncertainty, one thing remains clear: Graham Arnold will stay in charge until the Asian Cup, or until the FA needs a scapegoat to blame for its own mistakes.

Hassanin Mubarak
Hassanin Mubarak

Hassanin Mubarak is an Iraqi football writer and one of the founders of Ahdaaf, the leading source for English-language news on football in the Middle East. He has written previously for Arab News, When Saturday Comes, Goal.com, The Guardian, The Blizzard and AFC Quarterly.

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